

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 AMMAN 1295

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US IS XF
SUBJECT: NORMALIZATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

REF: STATE 046389

1. WE BELIEVE CERTAIN BASIC FACTORS WILL GUIDE
JORDANIAN REACTION TO THIS QUESTION, AND TO SOME
EXTENT ARAB REACTION IN GENERAL.

A) EXTENT OF TERRITORIAL WITHDRAWAL WILL EFFECT
MARKEDLY EXTENT TO WHICH ARABS ARE WILLING TO CON-
SIDER NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS;

B) PALESTINIAN ASPECT OF THE EQUATION IS
UNPREDICTABLE AND DIFFICULT TO CATEGORIZE, BUT GIVING TANGIBLE
EFFECT TO PRINCIPLES OF REPATRIATION AND COMPENSATION
WILL BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT;

C) ARAB PUBLIC OPINION STILL INFLUENCES GOVERN-
MENTAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE POINT TO A LARGE EXTENT;

D) NEVERTHELESS, JUST AS ISRAELIS ARE NOT CLEAR
IN THEIR PUBLIC POSITION ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE FOR
A COMBINATION OF PUBLIC OPINION (DOMESTIC POLITICAL)

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AND NEGOTIATING REASONS, THE ARABS ARE
THEMSELVES ALSO NOT LIKELY TO BE OVERLY CLEAR ON
NORMALIZATION ISSUES FOR SAME COMBINATION OF REASONS;

E) AS FOR JORDAN, IT HAS PROBABLY THE LEAST
INHIBITIONS ABOUT NORMALIZATION ON ITS OWN; HAS
GONE FARTHER AT PRESENT TIME IN THIS DIRECTION THAN
ANY OTHER ARAB STATE; AND IS AT SAME TIME MOST

LIKELY TO BE CONSTRAINED IN THE FUTURE BY
THE OTHER ARABS BECAUSE OF ITS ESSENTIALLY
WEAK POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD.

2. LOOKING AT THE TYPES OF QUESTIONS WHICH CON-
STITUTE NORMALIZATION, WE SEE--TRAVEL AND TRADE,
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, JOINT OR PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS, AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AS
POSSIBLE AREAS OF ACTIVITY. THESE COULD BE PHASED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH WITHDRAWALS. OTHERS MIGHT BE
IMPLEMENTED INDEPENDENTLY. SOME HAVE NATURAL
QUID PRO QUOS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE; SOME WHICH MUST
BE IMPLEMENTED ON BOTH SIDES CONTAIN MUTUAL BENEFITS;
AND SOME ARE UNLIKELY TO BE CARRIED OUT, EVEN SECRETLY
AND SEPARATELY, UNLESS AND UNTIL FULL PEACE ARRANGE-
MENTS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT AND ARE UNDERWAY. THESE
MEASURES ARE LOOKED AT FROM THE JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVE;
INDEED THE WEST BANK MAY ALREADY PROVIDE ONE EXAMPLE
AND AN AREA FOR FURTHER MUTUAL "BRIDGING" CONTACT
BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS.

3. TRAVEL AND TRADE:
PRESENT SITUATION--

A) WEST BANK IS OPEN TO VISITS BY ARABS WHO HAVE
A CONNECTION THERE (I.E., NON-RESIDENT PALESTINIANS AND
FAMILIES) AND WHO ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROHIBITED BY
SECURITY FACTORS. SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND VISIT EACH
YEAR. ONCE THERE, THEY CAN TRAVEL TO ISRAEL OF COURSE.
WEST BANKERS CAN LEAVE AND ARE USUALLY ALLOWED TO RETURN AFTER
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SIX WEEKS. FOREIGN (NONARAB) TOURISTS CAN GENERALLY
PERFORM THE SAME EVOLUTION. TRADE BETWEEN JORDAN
(AND THE ARAB WORLD) AND THE WEST BANK/GAZA AMOUNTED
IN 1975 TO \$45.9 M IN IMPORTS FROM THE WEST BANK AND
\$5.9M IN EXPORTS TO THE WEST BANK. WHILE ALL OF
THE IMPORTS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE OF WEST BANK/GAZA
ORIGIN, IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT A LARGE SHARE
ORIGINATES IN ISRAEL.
EARLY STAGE--

A) BOYCOTT MIGHT BE RESTRICTED BY ARABS TO
PRIMARY BOYCOTT.

B) SOME ISRAELI ARABS MIGHT BE PERMITTED TO
TRAVEL IN THE ARAB WORLD AS ONLY WEST
BANK ARABS NOW CAN.

C) TRADE MIGHT BE INCREASED BY REMOVAL OF
SOME JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS,
I.E., WEST BANK PRODUCTS COMPETITIVE WITH JORDANIAN
PRODUCTS MIGHT BE ADMITTED, AND IN GREATER QUANTITIES
AND INDEED ISRAELIS MIGHT ASSIST BY ALLOWING SOME INCREASED

ARAB INVESTMENT IN THE WEST BANK ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PRODUCTS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO BE SENT TO JORDAN, THEREBY BENEFITTING ISRAELI FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS.

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D) ISRAEL AND THE ARABS COULD ALLOW EACH OTHER AIR OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FOR SCHEDULED AIRCRAFT ON LIMITED ROUTES. THIS IS OF GREAT INTEREST TO JORDAN. FOR IT TO BE EFFECTIVE FOR ISRAEL, PRESUMABLY SEVERAL ARAB STATES WOULD HAVE TO GRANT SUCH RIGHTS.

E) POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF OPEN BANK TRANSFERS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

F) REDUCTION IN HOSTILE PROPAGANDA (NOT VERY HOSTILE EVEN NOW) AND EXCHANGE OF SOME PRINTED MATTER--ISRAELI-JORDANIAN TELEVISION AND RADIO ARE AT PRESENT FREELY HEARD AND WATCHED IN EACH COUNTRY, LATER STAGES--

A) OPENING BORDER TO TRAVEL BY ISRAELI TOURISTS AND BUSINESSMEN ON GRADUALLY INCREASING OR PHASED BASIS, PERHAPS STARTING WITH GROUP TOURS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

B) OPENING UP TRADE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB WORLD THROUGH WEST BANK OR OTHERWISE WITH GRADUAL REDUCTION IN RESTRICTIONS FOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY PURPOSES.

C) REMOVAL OF PRIMARY BOYCOTT.

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D) AIR AND SEA SERVICE, FREIGHT AND PASSENGER, MIGHT BE BEGUN AND EXPANDED. POSSIBLY ARAB STATES COULD CONSIDER SERVING WEST BANK/GAZA FIRST. JORDANIANS (AND POSSIBLY EVEN THE ISRAELIS) WOULD HAVE ECONOMIC INTEREST IN JORDAN OBTAINING ACCESS TO MEDITERRANEAN SEAPORTS, NOT ONLY IN GAZA BUT AT HAIFA.

E) FULLER EXCHANGE OF ACADEMIC PERSONALITIES AND LITERATURE BETWEEN THE TWO STATES.

4. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES

PRESENT--

A) NOT EXISTING OFFICIAL CONTACTS, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT FROM TIME TO TIME IN THIRD STATES, DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS FROM BOTH SIDES (WE KNOW THIS INCLUDES SOME JORDANIAN CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS) MEET AND DISCUSS ISSUES INFORMALLY AND UNOFFICIALLY WITH ISRAELIS IN SIMILAR CAPACITIES. IN ADDITION JORDAN-ISRAELI MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION IS A POINT OF CONTACT UNDER UN AUSPICES.

EARLY STAGES--

POSSIBLE ENCOURAGEMENT OF SEMI-OFFICIAL CONTACTS--MOST LOGICALLY AT A PEACE CONFERENCE OR INCONNECTION THEREWITH, I.E., KM 101-TYPE TALKS AS REQUIRED. THIS MIGHT BE EXPANDED AND ENCOURAGED IN OTHER AREAS IN THIRD STATES, AND PERHAPS WITH THE SELECTION OF A COUNTRY SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES TO REPRESENT SOME OR ALL OF THE INTERESTS OF ARAB STATES IN ISRAEL AND VICE VERSA.

LATER STAGES--

THE OPENING OF RELATIONS OFFICIALLY WITH THE USE OF A "PROTECTING POWER" IN EACH CAPITAL, TO BE EXPANDED GRADUALLY BY THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONNEL AND THE OPENING PERHAPS OF SPECIALIZED OFFICES OR MISSIONS--I.E., TRADE DELGATIONS, CONSULATES--LEADING TO FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. (WE FOUND EMBASSY CAIRO'S SUGGESTIONS IN THIS AREA

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PARTICULARLY WELL THOUGHT OUT AND DO NOT INTEND TO REPEAT THEM.)

5. JOINT OR PARELLEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

THIS IS AN AREA OF GREAT INTEREST TO JORDAN GIVEN THE LONG COMMON BORDER SPANNED BY ECONOMIC INTERESTS. PRESENT SITUATION--

THERE IS LITTLE CONTACT, MOSTLY LIMITED NOW

TO THE U.S. ROLE IN OFFERING INFORMAL GOOD OFFICES
TO RESOLVE THE YARMOUK WATER RIGHTS ISSUE IN
CONNECTION WITH BUILDING THE MAQARIN DAM. AS AN
IMMEDIATE STEP, RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM COULD
SERVE TO ASSURE ISRAEL OF JORDAN'S GOOD INTENTIONS BY
CONTINUING TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE WATER FOR THE
ADASIYAH TRIANGLE.

EARLY STATE--

A) COMMON AGREEMENT, ASSISTED BY THE U.S., ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEAD SEA POTASH RESOURCES--
USE OF COMMON DIKES AND AN OVERALL USE OF COMMON
PLANNING IN THE AREA, PERHAPS WITH THE U.S. AS AN
INTERMEDIARY, BUT ALSO RELYING ON CONTACTS DIRECTLY
THROUGH THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION FOR QUESTIONS
INVOLVING DIRECTLY DEMARCATION/BOUNDARY LINE PROBLEMS.

B) JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING
FOR THE UPPER GULF OF AQABA, THE WADI ARABA AND
JORDAN VALLEY.

C) EXCHANGE OF DATA IN AREAS OF TECHNOLOGY, AGRI-
CULTURE, ETC., WHICH WOULD BE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT TO

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EXDIS

BOTH SIDES, I.E., DRIP IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY,
HYDROLOGY, ETC.

LATER STAGES--

JOINT WORK ON WIDE-RANGING SERIES OF COOPERATIVE
PROJECTS, SUCH AS USE OF MEDITERRANEAN SEAWATER FOR
POWER PRODUCTION IN DEAD SEA AREA, EXCHANGE ON

A DIRECT BASIS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, PLANNING
ACTIVITIES, UNIVERSITY TRAINING AND SO FORTH.

6. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

PRESENT--

MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

EARLY STAGES--

A) USE OF PERSONNEL FROM BOTH SIDES TO OBSERVE
SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWALS AND DEMILITARI-
ZATION.

B) USE OF OBSERVATION POSTS,JOINT MILITARY
MISSIONS, AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE OF EACH
SIDE IN CERTAIN FIXED AREAS TO ENSURE CONTINUING
COMPLIANCE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE JOINT TRAVEL BY
GENEVA CONFERENCE DELEGATES TO THE AREA FOR
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ORIENTATION AND INSPECTION, PARTICULARLY AS PART OF
WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES.

C) JOINT NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY
MANEUVERS.

LATER STAGES--

FULLER EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AND JOINT MISSIONS.
BROAD USE OF TECHNICAL VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES BY
BOTH SIDES IN AGREED AREAS. AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE
MILITARY ATTACHES WITH WIDE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
AND OBSERVATION.

7. WHILE THE ABOVE DESCRIPTIONS ARE ROUGHLY INDICATIVE
OF PHASING, THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH
COULD OR INDEED SHOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT MORE
RAPIDLY. SUCH QUESTIONS AS YARMOUK WATER RIGHTS,
AN INCREASE IN WEST BANK INVESTMENT AND TRADE, AND
A REDUCTION IN PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL HARASSMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS MIGHT HELP. SOME QUID
PRO QUO WILL BE REQUIRED FOR CERTAIN OF THESE
MEASURES. WHILE IT MAY BE GROSSLY DISTURBING
TO THE ISRAELISN ONE OF THE MOST HELPFUL THINGS WHICH
COULD BE DONE WOULD BE QUIET AND QUICK ISRAELI ACTION ON THE
ISSUE OF HOLDING UP THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN
ALL OR A LARGE PART OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
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